Who’s Watching Local Government Finance?

Ben Worthy examines scrutiny and transparency around local government finances, highlighting that while recent changes have made keeping an eye on local authorities’ finances more difficult there is still a degree of outside scrutiny which does have an impact.

Local authorities spend £100 bn per year, so keeping an eye on their finances is vital. Now, in the wake of Birmingham City Council’s announcement of its financial distress, and a slew of nearly bankrupt authorities, it is even more urgent. In the past few years, a black hole has opened in local government finances up and down the country, leading to services being cut and amenities disappearing. Since 2020, seven councils have issued a section 114 notice, a formal procedure signalling that income can’t meet expenditure for the next year. Many more are admitting to being in financial trouble, from Kent to Derbyshire.

But how can this happen in full public view, and in an age of transparency? Local government in the UK is subject to some of the oldest provisions for monitoring spending by public bodies, dating all the way back to the Poor Laws, the controversial pre-welfare state system of poverty relief.

Such transparency should deter poor spending in two ways: by making councils feel ‘watched’, and thus less likely to make poor spending decisions, and then catching them out if they do so. The idea that anyone can, potentially, peek at their accounts should mean local bodies spend money wisely and avoid doing anything risky or unsound.

The oldest laws concern the right to inspect accounts, allowing the public to look over council books for a limited time period. On top of this, there are rights around access to a variety of council meetings (partially thanks to a young Margaret Thatcher) and, more recently, Freedom of Information and Open Data. External private sector auditors, appointed by the council, now delve into councils’ finances and publish their findings. All these sources should make it easy to ‘follow the money’ at local level.

Legislation in England in 2014 and 2017, and equivalent regulations and laws in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, went further, giving citizens and journalists the right to look over and object to audits of local government finances. It was hoped that the reforms would help create groups of ‘armchair auditors’ who would provide a regular and continual check, applying transparency pressure to local bodies. So far, so logical, and so open.

The problem is that since 2010, a number of changes, especially in England, have made keeping an eye on local government far harder.

First, the coalition government abolished the Audit Commission, the body that was supposed to appoint local government auditors and set the standards for auditors and oversee their work.

Second, the current system of private audit for local bodies that replaced it is now ‘close to breaking point’ (according to the Public Accounts Committee) – a ‘market failure, which has been worsening for five years, [that] eliminates a vital check and warning system’ (according to the Financial Times).

Finally, austerity measures and increasingly complex local government finance arrangements, where councils have been encouraged to invest in new areas, have made piecing together a clear picture of local finance almost impossible. An ‘accountability gap’ has opened up across English local government.

My current research examines who is watching local government, and who is using the right to inspect local government accounts in England (and equivalent regulations across Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland).

From the FOI responses received so far, few people seem to be watching local government finances. The numbers formally viewing local government accounts (asking to inspect them) is very low, if not non-existent, backing up earlier work.

Most councils get zero inspections, and the most common response to my question ‘how many people asked to inspect since 2019’ was ‘zero’. One cynical reading of local financial crises is that councils can, and do, get into very dire straits simply because they know no one is watching.

However, this cynicism may be unwarranted. It could be that tools such as FOI offer a much easier, and better way in, as they allow the public to ask specific questions, rather than wade through documents. Or it could be that data are being viewed online, rather than through formal physical inspection in a council office, which the original laws implied.

It is also true that, while it is generally not used across the UK, inspection is happening in particular places. Local groups from Lambeth to Whitby have had a powerful impact using it, and this report from Research For Action shows exactly how such audit rights can be used.

Most importantly, a glance at local media shows that, even if the public aren’t using the power to formally inspect local government accounts, local journalists often are, using it regularly to generate stories. Financial data seems to be being used alongside other tools, from internal reports to external auditors, to build a picture of what is going on. They look out for delays and flag problems (even for parish or town councils).

The big question then is what impact all this has on local government and local democracy. It seems the lack of pressure means some councils do not feel deterred from financial recklessness. The lack of public interest in the accounts, and the absence of an ‘army of auditors’ could then encourage secrecy and subterfuge, as appeared to happen at Thurrock. Here the authority sought to ‘try and hide its losses in what a government-commissioned inspection described as a “dereliction of leadership”’.  A series of deliberate and accidental obstacles put in the way of potential citizen auditors has also been catalogued.

Yet, on the other hand, there’s enough openness that councils are being caught out when they do badly, especially through local media reporting. Stories of ‘risky investments and poor governance’ are continually coming to light. And these stories  can have political consequences – a BBC study of councils in financial trouble found that voters did actually ‘punish failing councils’.

Few people are watching local government, and the transparency and accountability is imperfect. But even a bit of watching, by the right groups, can go a long way.

By Dr Ben Worthy, Senior Lecturer, Birkbeck University.

If you have used your right to inspect, please help the project by filling out the survey here.

Originally published here https://ukandeu.ac.uk/whos-watching-local-government/

Data and Lobbying in the UK: Is It Enough?

Screenshot from Transparency International https://openaccess.transparency.org.uk/

PACAC Lobbying Evidence September 2023

Dr Ben Worthy (Birkbeck College) and Dr. Michele Crepaz (QUB)

1.1 At present, the UK’s lobbying transparency system is made up of different overlapping and fragmented sources, which include the Register of Consultant Lobbyists, Registers of Financial Interests for MPs and Pees, a separate Register for Ministers, and data releases on meetings from Departments. Data are estimated to be held across 20 different websites, in various forms.[1]

Q: Are the current requirements consistently complied with?

2.1 There is widespread concern that recording and disclosure requirements are not complied with, whether through accident or design. Transparency International have highlighted how a combination of delay, incomplete data and loopholes mean some politicians can, and do, avoid compliance[2]. In 2023, there has been a slew of high profile stories, including the Prime Minister not properly declaring interests and one MP claiming to manipulate the rules to keep hospitality secret. Such avoidance and neglect mean the data create, at best, a kind of ‘semi-transparency’[3].   

2.2. While these cases may be minor or accidental, the integrity and smooth functioning of any transparency system is reliant on compliance. Stories and examples of senior figures flouting or ignoring the rules can bring the entire system into disrepute, and send a signal it can be undermined. Such weaknesses can have help undermine confidence in politicians: a recent Constitution Unit report shows how trust in elected officials is dropping, and voters express support for ‘stronger mechanisms to uphold integrity among politicians, including more powerful independent regulators’.[4]

Q. Does information disclosed provide sufficient transparency surrounding Ministers’ and Officials’ external engagement?

3.1 Across the system, transparency is insufficient in numerous ways. One problem concerns scope and coverage: For example, McKay and Wozniak’s (2020, 103) analysis of the UK’s Register of Consultant Lobbyists concluded that it ‘is among the very weakest of countries that have developed lobbying disclosure laws’. The Association of Professional Political Consultants ‘estimated that the statutory register of consultant lobbyists covers only 1 per cent of those who engage in lobbying activity’ and the Head of CIPR agreed that the ‘scope of the lobbying register…currently excludes around 95 per cent of lobbying activity. [5]

3.2  Another weakness concerns the loopholes, especially important in the ‘evolving’ and complex world of communications and contact in 2023. At present, the regulations fail to capture the growing informal methods of contact between lobbyist and lobbied, from texts to WhatsApp. Yet, as CSPL argued and seen in Greensill and elsewhere, it is ‘conversations, via WhatsApp and email, that are often the most enlightening’ [6].

3.2 A final concern is data incompleteness, across all the different tools available. As CSPL and others point out,  transparency data are ‘scattered, disparate, and not easily cross-referenced’[7]. Cabinet Office data on Ministerial meetings and interests are held in CSV, while lobbying meeting can be best seen on Transparency International’s own open access site[8]. Transparency International found in 2022 that ‘ten files were missing from seven departments’ websites, providing an information black hole equivalent to almost a year’s worth of ministerial engagements’[9]. There is also a question of the accuracy of the data itself. Rose Wiffen wrote of how among the latest data releases ‘there were almost 30 instances where the description of the meeting listed little more than the Department’s name or remit’.[10]

3.3  To work properly, any transparency system needs to be (i) accessible and to be (i) used. Transparency can deter corruption either through direct accountability (by politicians being ‘caught out’) or through a continual sense of being ‘watched’ (through the fear of being caught in the future)[11]. CSPL’s conclusion is a stark reminder that, when taken together, poor data on lobbying makes such actual or potential monitoring almost impossible: ‘it is too difficult to find out who is lobbying government, information is often released too late, descriptions…are ambiguous [and] transparency data is scattered, disparate, and not easily cross-referenced’.[12]

3.4 One study concluded that ‘collating information about ministerial meetings is too burdensome for any layperson to do’.[13] Another suggested that more information about lobbying can be currently found on voluntary registers of the industry than on officials government websites.[14] At present lobbying data is used only by a few specialist journalists and NGOs but could be potentially useful for a wider group of actors[15].

Q: Are data published in a sufficiently timely manner?

4.1 Across all the forms of transparency, delay is endemic. In 2022 Transparency International concluded that ‘despite ample time to collate and disclose these details, many parts of government shoot well beyond their own deadline’. A  lack of sanctions means there is no incentive for to improve. Timely publication is low cost if centralised and managed by an independent registrar. Best practices can be found in France, where the High Authority for Transparency in Public Life centrally manages the Registers of Interests, Lobbying Register, meetings, and political spending data.

Q: Is engagement through virtual platforms sufficiently transparent?

5. 1 The government’s proposals include a new ‘single platform’, new more regular (monthly) publication schedules, and more detail on ‘hidden’ or ‘anonymous’ lobbying. While these are welcome, it is likely to take a long time, doesn’t cover all WhatsApp or informal communications, and excludes special advisors[16].

Conclusion

Centralised data: we agree with CSPL that ‘the Cabinet Office should collate all departmental transparency releases and publish them in an accessible, centrally managed and searchable database’[17].

Closing loopholes: We agree with the Registrar agreed that any new register must ‘include which minister or permanent secretary was lobbied, dates of the communications, medium of communication – whether by meeting, letter or email, ph

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[1] See Whiffen, R (2023) Do the government’s proposals on standards and integrity go far enough? Civil Service World https://www.civilserviceworld.com/in-depth/article/do-the-governments-proposals-on-standards-and-integrity-go-far-enough

[2] See Transparency International (2022) https://www.transparency.org.uk/uk-government-lobbying-transparency-department-disclosure-delays

[3] See Ben Worthy, Cat Morgan, and Stefani Langehennig (2023) Registers of Interest: The Dangers of Semi-Transparency https://ukandeu.ac.uk/registers-of-financial-interests-the-dangers-of-semi-transparency/

[4] See Alan Renwick, Ben Lauderdale, Meg Russell, and James Cleaver (2023) ‘Public Preferences for Integrity and Accountability in Politics Results of a Second Survey of the UK Population’. Third Report of the Democracy in the UK after Brexit Project, March 2023. https://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/sites/constitution_unit/files/ucl_cu_report3_digital_final.pdf

[5] See Financial Times (2023) Letter: Lobbying activity should be captured on register

[6] CSPL (2021) Upholding Standards in Public Life Final report of the Standards Matter 2 Review, p4.

[7] CSPL (2021) Upholding Standards in Public Life Final report of the Standards Matter 2 Review, p19

[8] See the site at https://openaccess.transparency.org.uk/

[9]See Transparency International (2022) https://www.transparency.org.uk/uk-government-lobbying-transparency-department-disclosure-delays

[10] See Whiffen, R (2023) Do the government’s proposals on standards and integrity go far enough? Civil Service World https://www.civilserviceworld.com/in-depth/article/do-the-governments-proposals-on-standards-and-integrity-go-far-enough

[11] See Worthy, B., & Langehennig, S. (2022). Accountability, analysis, and avoidance: how PMO data impacts on Westminster. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 1-19.

[12] CSPL (2021) Upholding Standards in Public Life Final report of the Standards Matter 2 Review, p19

[13] McKay, A. M., & Wozniak, A. (2020). Opaque: an empirical evaluation of lobbying transparency in the UK. Interest Groups & Advocacy, 9(1), 102-118, 103

[14] Solaiman, B. (2021). Lobbying in the UK: Towards Robust Regulation. Parliamentary Affairs.

[15] Dommett, K., Hindmoor, A., and Wood, M. (2017). Who meets whom: Access and lobbying during the coalition years. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 19(2), 389-407. AND Crepaz, M., and Kneafsey, L. (2022). Usability of transparency portals: Examination of perceptions of journalists as information seekers. Public Administration, 100(4), 978-998.

[16] See https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-lobbying-crackdown/ and https://www.ft.com/content/44ed5a4f-e845-48dc-9498-7cf2fa3f5048

[17] See Transparency International (2022) https://www.transparency.org.uk/uk-government-lobbying-transparency-department-disclosure-delays

More Money, More Problems: Does Data Impact on Politics?

Ben Worthy, Stefani Langehennig and Cat Morgan examine a new tool for scrutinising the influence of money on Westminster politics and reflect on what the impact of enhanced transparency in this area might be.

In the last two decades, new platforms, applications and databases offer voters the chance to see what their MP has been doing at the push of a button. Sites like TheyWorkForYou allow users to see individual members’ voting records, appearances in the Commons, and financial declarations. Between 2019 and 2022, we ran a Leverhulme Trust-funded study which looked at the impact of this data. We found that, while voting records on the sites were relatively comprehensive, financial records and data on money were scattered, fragmentary and full of loopholes and gaps.

In early 2023, Sky News/Tortoise media created a new app called Westminster Accounts, which brings together data on donations and register of interests, pulling them into one easy to use tool. The aim is to ‘give voters the chance to explore how much their MP has earned…how much they have declared in donations – and from whom’ and to see ‘how money moves through the political system’.

But how has this tool been used, and what sort of impact will it have?

Tortoise reports in an email that the site had 500,000 views in its first four days, which compares with around 200,000 to 300,000 monthly visits to voting websites. Westminster Accounts has triggered a rolling wave of scrutiny, lighting up the dark space where money meets politics. The coverage began, almost inevitably, with rankings of the highest earners but has moved into questions around who the biggest donors to MPs are and the sometimes murky companies behind them, and scrutiny of the funding of informal Parliamentary groups, called APPGs.

Most use of these tools is local, with constituents using postcode finders to see what their MP has (or hasn’t) done. Leaders and high profile politicians often attract attention too, and Boris Johnson’s large £1 million donation has attracted a great deal of  scrutiny from the media (and speculation that it could be used to ‘fund a comeback’). Beyond individuals, there is number crunching from various angles, and there are often national, regional, and local ‘lists’ or rankings, as you can see here in Birmingham, and lists of top donors.

Users of the database so far, as with TheyWorkForYou, seem to be a similar blend of journalists, campaigners, the public, and politicians. The Westminster Accounts data has been picked up far and wide by the media, from Lincoln to Belfast, and Cardiff to Edinburgh.

Theresa May’s own local paper flagged up her status as number one outside earner. Even specialist publications like the Times Higher Education found an angle, such as a piece on MPs with second jobs in universities. Campaigners are using the data to call for change, while the local letters pages and social media seem to show members of the public have been conducting their own calculations.

Yet data are often politicised, and MPs and their staff make up a large 2% of all the users of TheyWorkForYou. At least one MP has utilized Westminster Accounts so far, asking a question at PMQs about Boris Johnson, and you can see local opposition parties picking data up, such as the Wokingham Lib-Dems.

So what will the release of this data do? They are certainly opening up, and creating new transparency pressures. They are likely to make MPs more accountable – we found voting data made Members speak more about how they voted, as a kind of ‘informatory accountability’. MPs are already explaining more about their donations and interests in their local papers. Some MPs may be keener to explain themselves, and think twice about their sources of funding.

This is likely to vary depending, as we found, on whether they are in government or opposition, how long they’ve been in Parliament, and whether they are male or female. MPs in government face greater scrutiny than those in opposition and, as has been shown, female MPs generally face greater scrutiny than their male colleagues. However, longevity seems to make for less sensitivity, as those in seats longer were generally less worried by data-driven scrutiny. Crucially, the issues of second jobs and outside incomes are very much a Conservative problem, as 37 of the 45 top earners were Conservative MPs (and it is also, interestingly, a male problem).

In the short term, the data will help confirm Labour’s plans to ban second jobs, and call into question the Conservatives’ dropping of reforms over limiting second jobs or caps on earning in 2021 that they originally supported. It has also triggered a rare joint letter from the Speaker of the Common and Speaker of the Lords calling for reform to the system of All Party Parliamentary Groups. In the longer term, the new database, like voting data before it, will probably become a ‘short-cut’, a source of ammunition and a standard go to measure of MPs probity, especially at election time.

How it will impact on the public is less clear. As this poll put it, ‘half of Britons disapprove of MPs having second jobs – but it depends on what the job is’. It is likely that the narratives and stories will feed public perceptions that already exist about politicians’ self-interest.

In a poll in 2021, 65% of those asked felt that ‘most MPs are too easily influenced by the rich and powerful’ with 55% believing there was ‘insufficient transparency’ over ethics and only 31% that MPs ‘act with integrity’. Headlines that MPs are ‘part-time’ will reinforce this, and some MPs are concerned that the public assume money goes directly into MPs’ pockets, rather than on campaigns and office costs, where it really ends up.

The data will certainly shine a light and create pressure, but whether it will help ‘clean’ up politics and public perceptions is a different matter.

By Dr Ben Worthy, Senior Lecturer, Birkbeck University, Dr Stefani Langehennig, Associate Professor of the Practice, University of Denver, and Dr Cat Morgan, Postdoctoral Research Associate, Heriot-Watt University.

This post is based on research by the authors. You can see a journal article here, or see the final report and project site here.

Originally published here https://ukandeu.ac.uk/more-money-more-problems-does-more-data-impact-on-politics/

What Does FOI Need?

The Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Select Committee has published its report on The Cabinet Office FOI Clearing House, and was heavily critical both of the Cabinet Office’s approach to FOI and, ironically, its opaqueness. Read Martin Rosenbaum’s great summary here.

My conclusion chimes with the Committee’s arguments. FOI is under threat from poor compliance, funding, and high-level secrecy. If FOI needs one thing, beyond money and reform, it is care and support.

1. Politicians should like FOI. They should make speeches and extoll its virtues. A few have, including Gordon Brown and David Cameron, but most remain silently sulking. Openness can actually be good for politicians, as well as politics, pre-empting trouble and scandal and even getting a reputational payoff. Publish and be damned can be a sensible strategy.

2. Politicians shouldn’t moan about FOI. Tony Blair called himself a nincompoop for passing the law, which is fine, he can call himself that. The problem is that the Prime Minister criticising a law sends signals to everyone else that the law doesn’t matter, and they should dislike it too. That is not fine.

3. Politicians should stop hiding. There’s concern at a general slow-down of FOI. Openness problems, like Orwell’s famous fish going off, start at the top. Government by Whatsapp, hiding lobbying meetings and refusals to answer FOI requests are all part of a wholesale undermining.

4.  This creates what I call a collective irresponsibility-the more people in government don’t play the FOI game, the harder it is to punish wrong-doing.

See my written evidence to the committee here.

Standards Committee Evidence: Evidence on the quality and Impact of the Register of Members’ Financial Interests

Ben Worthy (Birkbeck College), Cat Morgan (Birkbeck College), and Michele Crepaz (QUB)

This research note focuses on the quality of data on Members’ interests and activity. It is based partly on a Leverhulme trust funded study of MPs and Parliament (by Worthy and Morgan) and on ongoing research on lobbying across the EU (by Crepaz).

Summary

-The UK register contains numerous flaws in terms of its operation and content.

-It has been regularly used by small groups since the 1990s with surges of interest, such as in the wake of the Paterson vote in November 2021.

-The ‘semi-transparency’ of the current register creates suspicion, but better data can have a positive impact on behaviour and public perceptions.

How well does the register work?

In her evidence to the committee, Kathryn Stone set out the clearest idea of what the register is for: ‘the purpose of the register…should be about how we record anything that influences a Member’s thoughts, words and actions, so that it is transparent—not least for members of the public to get a better view’[1]. Taking this definition, the current register falls short.

Alastair Tibbit spoke in late 2021 of how ‘almost everything about the system for publishing ‘Members’ Financial Interests…is suboptimal, if not outright broken’ and felt that data ‘are almost impossible to find, analyse and follow.’^[2] In his 2016 book Parliament Limited Martin Williams estimated that only around 40% of interests were declared on the register.

There are technical issues with the data. As journalist and academic Dr Maryam Ahmed pointed out, the register ‘is not machine readable’, is ‘available only in a highly variable free text format’ and ‘not available via bulk download’.^[3] Dr Simon Weschle agreed that data are not standardised, and extraction for analysis is, in some cases ‘impossible’.^[4]

A wider difficulty, as pointed out by Esther Webber and Henry Dyer, is how the data fails to link to other incomplete data, such as that held by Companies House.

To find out about MPs’ interests, users need to draw on a combination of internet searches, FOI, and other tools to pull together a proper picture. This makes for a tendency towards investigation and exposes.  

Monitoring of Interests: who is using it?

The data on MPs’ interests has been, as Peter Geoghegan put it, ‘hiding in plain sight’ for many years[5]. Our research found that a small number of journalists, campaigners and developers regularly used it. Users include investigative journalists, lobbying and transparency campaigners, as well as analytic sites. Interestingly, local, and regional press also draw on the data (see below).

There has been interests stories based on data for as long as Registers have existed. Attention has often clustered around scandals, but there is a regular ‘bubbling away’ at national and local level, which can spike around times when data are released (see data box below). Recent stories based on register data include MPs links to fossil fuel interests, MPs employing family members[6] or MPs earnings from their second incomes during the pandemic. [7]Data lobo also conducted detailed analysis of MPs outside interests between June 2017 and October 2019.[8]

Stories and reporting featuring the Register of Interests data: December 28th -Jan 28th 2022   Telegraph ‘Kathryn Stone: ‘It’s bonkers that I was blocked from investigating Boris Johnson over Downing Street flat’, 26 January 2022 London Economic ‘Calls to limit MP second job earnings as some claw in huge figures’, 22 Jan 2021. Staffordshire Live ‘Nice work if you can get it: MPs hoovering up the freebies’, 12 January 2022 Hampshire Live ‘The loophole that allows two Hampshire MPs to employ their wives despite law change’, 5 January 2022 Daily Mail ‘Multi-millionaire Tory MP at the centre of the second jobs scandal earns £47,000 for just 34 hours work’, 22 January 2022 National World ‘He’s been superb’: firm Andrew Bridgen lobbied for say they never paid him despite official declarations’, 14th January 2022 Newcastle World ‘Where did this Northumberland MP Guy Opperman take money from and why is he being investigated?’, 5th January 2022 The Spectator ‘Keir’s £1,500 oil painting’, 7 January 2022

The aftermath of the Paterson vote illustrates the potential of data. Initially a few searchers found out how many MPs voting to scrap the system were either under investigation or were earning second incomes[9]. Data was examined from a Scottish and Welsh angle, and party leaders came in for particular scrutiny. There was a clear trickle-down effect, as the analysis went from the level of all MPs, down to regional groups or individual MPs in the local press. Not all coverage has been negative, and some MPs gained positive coverage, such as the Isle of Wight headline ‘No second job for Isle of Wight MP Bob Seely’.

What impact does the register have?

The negative impact

The danger is that the poor quality of data, and semi-transparency it creates, leads to exposes and scandals which reinforce poor views of all politicians. As past scandals showed, partial data, and the way in which it is exposed, can lead to greater uncertainty and suspicion, which worsens rather than clears up controversy[10].

Ethan Stone and Ian Hislop pointed to how the number of MPs with large scale earnings from second jobs or potential conflicts of interests is relatively small^[11]. However, the exposure and uncertainty ignite suspicion rather than reassures, as Ian Hislop put it ‘the public perception is: “Was this the tip of the iceberg?”. In the wake of the Paterson vote perceptions of corruption increased. As importantly 71% of those polled felt MPs ‘make decisions to a large extent/to some extent benefit their own financial interests’[12]. This is despite the fact that public attitudes can be nuanced. As one study found ‘They do not respond negatively to all second incomes…they are most hostile to politicians who take on part-time company directorships’[13]

The positive impact

The register has led to transparency and accountability. Between 2010 and 2021 at least 10 MPs were made to apologise for failures to declare interests[14]. Research conducted on a similar Register of Interests in the Republic of Ireland suggests that potential conflict of interest disclosure can reduce people’s perceptions of corruption of MPs, assuming disclosure rules are correctly implemented, and full transparency is pursued[15]

Even in its current state, research shows the existence of reporting requirements has some effect in deterring certain behaviour. As Henry Dyer pointed out, the requirement to record data on family employees engaged in lobbying may do exactly this-and the lack of use is sign of its preventive effect. He suggested that ‘if you were to scrap it, you might see a resurgence of people whose partners or children are in lobbying’[16].

So far, in the wake of the Paterson vote, there was also some behaviour change. At least one  MP self-reported undeclared interests, two admitted possible breaches and three dropped their second jobs[17].

Recommendations

• Data should be standardised and accessible in an easily searchable format. It should also be combined with the Ministerial Register as Henry Dyer argued, even if this entails some ‘doubling up’.  Work by Michele Crepaz found that the Register of Interest of held by the French High Authority for Transparency in Public Life stands out as one of the best examples, as entries are fully digitised (with no pdfs), fully searchable and data is downloadable in line with open data requirements^[18].
• It should be linked to other open government registers such as the Register of Consultant Lobbyists.
• It should be kept and enforced by an independent authority which centralises the function of monitoring integrity in public life.

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[1] Formal meeting (oral evidence session): Code of Conduct consultation, Wednesday 26 January 2022

[2] Alastair Tibbit (2012) ‘Is Britain a corrupt country? Here’s why it’s impossible to tell’ Open Democracy 13 November 2021,

[3] See this tweet by Dr Maryam Ahmed https://twitter.com/_datamimi/status/1489176936760885254

[4] Weschle, S. (2021). Parliamentary Positions and Politicians’ Private Sector Earnings: Evidence from the UK House of Commons. The Journal of Politics, 83(2), 706-721.

[5] Peter Geoghegan (2021) ‘Why are so many Tory MPs able to get filthy rich? Because we let them’ Guardian

Thu 11 Nov 2021

[6] Pamela Duncan, Jonathan Watts, and Georgina Quach ‘Tories received £1.3m from fossil fuel interests and climate sceptics since 2019’, Guardian 25 Oct 2021: Poppy Wood ‘Top of Form

Bottom of Form

1 in 8 MPs use loophole to employ close family members with taxpayer money after 2017 rule change’, Independent November 11, 2021

[7]Martin Williams (2021) Open Democracy MPs net £6m from second jobs since pandemic began Open Democracy 5  November 2021

[8] See Data Lobo MPs additional income – Lobo (datalobo.com)

[9] See Adam Bychawski (2021) Quarter of MPs calling to replace sleaze watchdog have been punished by it’ Open Democracy

3 November 2021: Sam Bright (2021)  Conservative MPs Opposing Lobbying Suspension have Second Jobs, Worth £1 Million 3 Byline Times November 2021

[10] See Harvey, P., Reeves, M., & Ruppert, E. (2013). ‘Anticipating failure: Transparency devices and their effects’. Journal of Cultural Economy, 6(3), 294-312.

[11] See National World analysis ‘MPs have received almost £10m from second jobs and other work outside of Parliament during the Covid pandemic’ 8^th November 2021

[12] YouGov (2021) ‘Second jobs and sleaze: what do Britons make of a murky week in Westminster?’  12 November 2021

[13] Campbell, R., & Cowley, P. (2015). Attitudes to moonlighting politicians: Evidence from the United Kingdom. Journal of Experimental Political Science, 2(1), 63-72.

[14] See Sarah Priddy (2021) Apologies by MPs to the House of Commons since 1979 Research Briefing, 23 July 2021

[15] See Forthcoming Crepaz and Arikan (2022) ‘The Effects of Political Transparency on Political Trust and Perceived Corruption: Evidence from a Survey Experiment’ (Crepaz Michele, QUB and Gizem Arikan, TCD)

[16] Formal meeting (oral evidence session): Code of Conduct consultation, Wednesday 26 January 2022

[17] Greg Heffer ‘Ross reports himself to sleaze watchdog over failure to declare MSP and football earnings’ “.

13 November 2021: Clea Spkopeliti ‘Two MPs admit using parliamentary offices for paid outside work’, 13 November 2021: Greg Heffer MPs give up second jobs worth £250k a year in wake of Westminster sleaze row, 2 December 2021 16:39, UK

[18] See the register here https://www.hatvp.fr/le-repertoire/.

Should we be allowed to see MPs’ voting records?

Originally written for the Constitution Unit blog here

Sites like TheyWorkForYou have led to a greater use of parliamentary voting records as a means of holding MPs to account, but it can also lead to misunderstandings about the position taken by the person voting, and to those absent due to maternity or illness being branded lazy. Ben Worthy and Cat Morgan discuss how their research has highlighted some of the problems and benefits of this additional data being made more readily available.

Watching Westminster has got a great deal easier. Since 2005, a whole array of new formal and informal disclosure tools mean we can watch, analyse and verify what MPs and peers are doing much more easily, often at the push of a button. Our Leverhulme project looks across this shifting landscape of searchable digital platforms of MPs’ expenses data, register of interests declarations, and Freedom of Information  requests.  

Most famously, at the centre of these transparency ecosystems stands TheyWorkForYou (TWFY), which monitors MPs’ voting and other activities. Created by volunteers in 2004 and run by mySociety since 2005, it allows us to see individual MPs’ (and peers’) voting records far more easily than in the past. For each MP it offers up, as the website describes, ‘a summary of their stances on important policy areas such as combating climate change or reforming the NHS’, described with phrases such as ‘generally voted for’, ‘always voted against’, and ‘never voted for’. Elsewhere it lists their full record, appearances, and declarations on the register of interests. It averages around 200,000 to 300,000 monthly visits, though this jumps amid elections or scandals.

And some MPs are not happy. A tweet by John Ashmore summarised, perhaps rather too pithily, the two reasons for their unhappiness or concern:

The first worry is that the voting data offers a distorted view. It doesn’t discriminate, for example, between certain types of votes and over-simplifies the rather complex realities. This means, as Stephen Bush recently explained, Green MP Caroline Lucas appears to have ‘voted a mixture of for and against greater regulation of hydraulic fracturing (fracking) to extract shale gas’ because she opposed, and voted against, legislation she considered too weak. Some of the most controversial votes, such as the Free School Meals vote, only make sense in the light of the fact it was an Opposition Day vote, something the site doesn’t explain either. Our research has shown how the data is biased and unevenly focused on, for example, high profile or controversial MPs or particular votes. Aggregated data easily becomes a metric to measure, compare and create yardsticks for what constitutes a ‘good’ or ‘bad‘ MP, giving the illusion of objectivity and measurability.

MPs’ unhappiness has gone public. Thirty Conservative MPs published an open letter to the Guardian in 2019 complaining about being misrepresented on their climate change records, and a full 50 complained in a letter to the chief executive of mySociety in 2021 that ‘misleading‘ data ‘misrepresented’ their positions on climate change.

It isn’t just what the data shows; it’s what it doesn’t show. Data only measures what is there. As the journalist Marie Le Conte put it, ‘sharing screenshots of an MP’s voting history misses out vital pieces of context’. TWFY contains no data on whipping instructions, and yet, as I endlessly tell my students, party and party loyalty are the key to (most) of what happens in the House of Commons. Moreover, the data only highlights some areas, such as voting or expenses. It could be argued that it even over-measures these, creating too much emphasis on ‘cliff hanger’ votes or MPs’ spending, leaving vital activities such as constituency work hidden in a kind of data-less darkness.

The second concern is who is using the data and where it goes. The worry is that it isn’t being used by the ‘public’ for a kind of democratic enlightenment but is abused by those wishing to push a certain message. Users of TWFY are quite numerous but definitely skewed. There is a small proportion of new users, but mostly, they are the ‘usual suspects’. Analysis of TheyWorkForYou.com found users to be a mixture of the engaged public, private companies, NGOs, and the media, with most users already engaged or interested in politics. We found that searches focus on government MPs in particular, as well as on controversial or high profile votes. More generally, the concern, as ever, is that overly represented white men are watching well-off, overly represented white men.

Perhaps more to the point, political groups of many shades and sizes do use this data to push their agendas. While TWFY is careful to explain the context of the data and asks those using it to tweet with care, this doesn’t always happen. This runs from the national media to the regional press and even small local media outlets, which sometimes leads to MPs being asked in advance how they might vote. This then provokes, in turn, explanation, resistance and further conflict. Data can sometimes close the gap between voters and legislators, but it can make for greater conflict and controversy too. Does Jeremy Corbyn’s voting record show he was more anti-Europe than Thatcher or always on the right side of history? Take your pick.

However, there are several good democratic reasons as to why, despite its limitations, TWFY should not be ’shut down’.

First, it’s important to remember that, if we were back in 1995, to even know how an MP voted you needed the local press to report on a vote or to take a pretty long and winding journey to wherever you could find a physical copy of Hansard. The mere existence of TWFY is a step forward in transparency.

Second, even if it’s only rough, it allows you to see where an MP stands. To take the example of climate change, Conservative MPs should perhaps be careful with their public complaints. While the details may be skewed, the general point that some Conservative MPs have a worrying attitude to climate change is broadly right. Other data backs this up. A recent survey showed that Conservative MPs were less likely than their own voters to prioritise environmental issues. Conservative MPs have more donations from fossil fuel companies, and one in 15 Conservative MPs seem to believe climate change is a myth. Nor is it only Conservatives, as the first complaint over climate and voting records was a complaint by Labour MPs to the Advertising Standards Authority back in 2005. This sort of complaint at being misrepresented is also far from new. MPs made similar claims of a ‘narrow focus’ and ‘misrepresentation’ with the arrival of the press and sketch writers in the 1840s. Neither Charles Dickens nor TWFY were, in their time, welcome in Westminster.

It’s also a bit rich for MPs to complain. TWFY cite that 2% of all users are within the parliamentary estate, and that they use the data for a mixture of reasons; research on other MPs, defence of their own records, and championing their reputation.

Third, even if it’s not used by the public, data still reaches them. Once published, it is then picked up or developed by the media and campaigners, as well as across social media. Outside of the usual suspects, academics are significant data users, creating detailed analyses of which MPs blocked Brexit.

It’s not only the users but also the uses that vary, and data can be deployed in a seemingly infinite variety of ways. It is deployed heuristically to understand MPs’ voting positions, or inferentially, around lobbying or donations. Voting data has created several spin-off innovations, such as sites watching particular issues like climate change voting records. It is also used to predict and anticipate rebellions, with rolling rebel lists identifying unhappy MPs, such as before the COVID-19 vote of December 2021 or Labour MPs rebelling over the MI5 bill. After the controversial Owen Paterson ‘standards’ vote, data was quickly found on how many of those supporting Paterson had an outside income or were themselves under investigation. Data can also inform us about where they voted, as well as how. It seems that this summer 12 MPs, including the Conservative Chief Whip, voted by proxy from the England vs Denmark game at Euro 2020.

Finally, it does sometimes have a democratic impact, and a lot of monitoring fizzles into an angry wave but not always. Even then, as an aside, calling users ‘internet half wits’ or ‘meme-merchants’ ignores the increasingly important role of memes, graphics and images in engaging the public with politics.

Our study has shown that monitoring and watching MPs does make them more accountable. MPs share more explanations and justifications in Hansard, on Twitter or in the local press – some of which are anticipated (such as by ‘how will your MP vote’ articles) or reported on after the action (such as social media posts saying, ‘I voted for/against X’). In 2021, Conservative MPs who voted against the government’s COVID-19 lockdown measures and tier system took to Twitter to explain their decisions – making memes themselves both before and after key votes.

Publishing voting data can also have anticipated or reactive consequences. In the weeks after the Paterson votes, amid all the possible reforms that might come of it, some MPs quietly resigned from their second jobs.

It can even help push along institutional change. In 2013, the Sun used voting record data to create a list of the country’s ‘laziest MPs’ featuring Lucy Powell, who quickly pointed out that she was on maternity leave. Not only was the article withdrawn and an apology made, but the controversy helped the push for MPs on parental leave to be allowed to vote by proxy, which was instituted in 2019.

The data on TFWY is accessible, user-friendly, and searchable, making watching Westminster easier than ever before. Data can be distorted, over-simplified and used out of context while simultaneously providing transparency about MPs’ and peers’ activities. Many MPs feel under continuous surveillance, creating greater accountability for their actions, which is no bad thing. When using the available date on parliamentary voting, it is worth remembering that although the media report on voting records like football results, they are often just the beginning of a political process rather than the end.

The project on which the above draws is funded by the Leverhulme Trust. More information on the project can be found on the Leverhulme website.

The Cabinet Office Freedom of Information Clearing House: Written Evidence to PACAC

Written evidence from Ben Worthy[1] (FOI 21)

Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee

The Cabinet Office Freedom of Information Clearing House

Overview

• The Cabinet Office has performed poorly in terms of dealing with its own FOI requests.
• The Clearing House’s official role has been to ‘coordinate requests’. There is evidence of a secondary ‘hidden’ role, where the Clearing House has monitored and flagged requests and requesters, especially around 2005-2006 and again from 2019 onwards. This has likely caused delay and had a wider chilling on government responsiveness.
• Poor institutional performance and interference in the FOI process is part of a wider set of problems and resistance FOI is encountering in 2021.

The Cabinet Office and FOI

• In terms of signals and serving as an exemplar, the Cabinet Office has performed consistently poorly. According to the IFG, the Cabinet Office has rarely gone above 40-50% of requests released in full, rising higher during only four quarters between 2005 and 2020. In the last two years timeliness has also dipped[2].
• While this may in part be due to the sensitivity of certain topics, and the Cabinet Office’s closeness to the heart of decision-making, other departments dealing with similarly sensitive issues, such as the Ministry of Defence, have performed better and been more open.
• As the Cabinet Office helped develop the law, and has, at numerous times, overseen the operation of FOI, the concern is that the poor record sends a signal to other bodies.

The operation of the Clearing House 2004-2021

• In attempting to trace the work of the Clearing House, it is important to keep in mind that it  has changed form, location, and function. The Cabinet Office explained in 2021 how it ‘was established in 2004 and has operated in different forms since the Freedom of Information Act came into force in January 2005’[3]. It has also been criticised on numerous occasions for a lack of transparency about its work
• In 2004, the then DCA established a central Clearing House as an ‘expert advice centre to which cases can be referred by central government departments for further assistance when assessing the duty to release or withhold information’[4]. However, it was hinted at the time that the Clearing House was a short-term innovation, with a limited existence or life-span. In 2021 the work was described similarly as ‘providing assistance on complex FOI requests while also making sure sensitive information, including that related to national security, is handled appropriately’[5].
• It is hard to assess how the system has worked, and its exact operation and caseload fluctuated. In 2005, it ‘had provided advice on over 3,100 cases in 2005, which represents about 10% of the requests made to central government’. [6] MOJ data supports the idea that referrals and work lessened after 2005.

Referrals to the Clearing House

Year	Number of requests	% of central government requests
2005	3168	16
2006	2428	14
2007	1228	7
Average	2275	13

(MOJ 2008)[7]

• Our research in 2010 found that numbers had declined further and revealed more specific details as to the work of the Clearing House, with ‘requests…referred to the clearing house if they hit certain ‘triggers’. The triggers concerned ‘requests which are complex, high-profile or have broader ramifications…rather than simply being time-consuming or awkward’[8].
• At the time of writing in2021, it is unclear quite how many FOI requests are dealt with by the Clearing House. Several requests on WhatDoTheyKnow.com asking for precise numbers via different departments are still awaiting response.

The impact of the Clearing House on the FOI regime

• The central question, as the Information Commissioner put it, is whether the ‘Clearing House is dictating to departments how to respond to FOI requests or offering advice in an expected manner’[9].
• There is a grey area between the two activities. Looking at an equivalent request system in Canada, Professor Alasdair Roberts described how ‘co-ordination’ could lead to delay as ‘routines that are set up for perfectly legitimate reasons – to advise on FOI policy in difficult cases – could soon be bent to serve illegitimate purposes… an excessive preoccupation with damage control and ‘spin’ can…lead once again to unjustified delay in processing FOI requests’.[10]
• There is evidence, from leaks and FOI requests, that the Clearing House has, at certain points, adopted a dual role between public co-ordination and more hidden or private monitoring  of certain types of requests and requesters.
• Writing in 2005, one study concluded that the Clearing House had ‘helped to ensure a far more consistent approach across Whitehall to the interpretation of exemption provisions and application of the public interest test’[11]. However, doubts about the role of the UK Clearing House began to surface in parallel. According to the Times, the ‘Orwellian’ Clearing House was a ‘symptom’ of the ‘instinct to resist disclosure’ and had ‘assumed the de facto role of blocking the release of information’. As an example, the Times further cited a leaked memo from the Clearing House advising departments to ‘neither confirm nor deny’ the existence of requested documents that deal with sensitive or media related issues, as even acknowledgement of a document’s existence can be ‘damaging’.[12]
• The 2006 investigation by the Constitutional Affairs Select Committee pointed out that ‘there is no evidence either to support the allegations that the clearing house causes delays and blocks information requests, or to refute those allegations’. However, it went on ‘this is primarily because the clearing house has not provided information about its activities, even in response to specific FOI requests’[13].
• By time of our work in 2010, which was cited by the Cabinet Office in 2021, it was claimed by officials that the Clearing House had taken a more ‘pastoral’ role and there was sense it had declined in influence and importance. As ‘over time the triggers have been relaxed…the clearing house has moved from being ‘directive’ to more ‘pastoral’, allowing departments to answer more requests autonomously’.[14]It was staffed by officials who, like FOI officers themselves, were often engaged in other roles simultaneously. It is important to note that we did not specifically examine or investigate in any depth claims around the hidden or informal role.
• Between 2019-2021 there was mounting evidence, from requests and leaks, that the Clearing House had shifted further towards suppression and secrecy. Again, as in 2005, the Clearing House was described as having an ‘Orwellian’ role[15]. The evidence included circulated lists of requests and requesters, potentially in breach of privacy laws, and advice around seeing drafts[16]. In attempting to assess how weighty the Clearing House ‘advice’ is perceived, the judgment argued ‘it is noteworthy that, while they do not follow the advice of Clearing House, Ms Atkins confirmed “they have to explain”.’[17] It is likely, as in Canada, the Clearing House is a cause delay and interference.

The Challenges to FOI in 2021

• The influence of the Cabinet Office and Clearing House is part of wider set of political challenges and resistance to FOI in the UK. Efforts to avoid FOI and public scrutiny have involved a combination  of ‘hiding’, ‘fighting’ and ‘undermining’[18]. 
• Claims around interference by the Clearing House match with evidence of political resistance elsewhere in the UK at senior levels. In 2018 the Scottish Information Commissioner spoke of claims of political interference and some ‘deliberate delaying tactics and requests being blocked or refused for tenuous reasons’ under the separate Scottish FOI Act. The RHI Inquiry in Northern Ireland revealed worrying signs of poor record keeping and avoidance of minutes at senior levels, with allegations of interference[19]. Allegations around the use of private emails and WhatApp to avoid official records are the flipside of such activity.
• More generally, the poor performance of leading departments at the Cabinet Office can encourage others to deprioritise and neglect FOI, and signal that poor performance invites no repercussions. Work by the IFG has shown a constituent downward trend in compliance with FOI requests across central government: ‘Across the first three quarters of 2020, 43.6% of ‘resolvable’ requests were granted in full, 14.5% were partially withheld and 41.9% were withheld in full. This compares to 64.2% being granted in full and only 21.3% withheld in full in 2005’[20]. This neglect can lead to a kind of ‘collective irresponsibility’, whereby broad non-compliance means delay and non-compliance go unpunished and spread further in a negative spiral of neglect.
• As well as systematic problems, a succession of senior politicians and officials have created a narrative of failure around the law. In 2010 Tony Blair argued FOI was hampering decision-making and was a tool used only by opponents and journalists. In 2012 David Cameron described the law as something that was ‘furring up the arteries of government’. The former Cabinet Secretary Gus O’Donnell claimed in 2015 that it has ‘hamstrung’ government, though when pressed he could only offer three isolated examples[21]. There is a very little evidence to back up these claims, but the fact they are stated by such senior figures give them credence and frame the law as a ‘problem’-and could even provoke further poor behaviour and neglect.

Recommendations

• Given the continued questions around the Clearing House, there should be greater openness around its operations, with data around the percentage of requests and more detail about its procedures made available.
• Greater support and championing of FOI by senior politicians should be encouraged, especially Ministers in charge of poor performing departments. This should involve speeches, articles and other initiatives underlining the importance of compliance with law.

August 2021

5

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[1] I am a Senior Lecturer in Politics at Birkbeck College, University of London. I have studied FOI and transparency in the UK and elsewhere since 2003. I was also co-author on the book cited by the Cabinet Office, (2017) The Politics of Freedom of Information: How and Why Governments Pass Laws That Threaten Their Power. Manchester: MUP

[2] See IFG (2021) Whitehall Monitor https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/whitehall-monitor-2021/transparency

[3] See First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) Information Rights Decision notice fs50841228 Appeal Reference: EA/2020/0240 Heard on CVP platform On 29/30 April 2021

[4] See CASC (2006). Seventh Report: Freedom of Information: One Year On, 29

[5] Quoted in First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) Information Rights Decision notice fs50841228 Appeal Reference: EA/2020/0240

[6] See CASC(2006), p.29 and First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) Information Rights Decision notice fs50841228 Appeal Reference: EA/2020/0240 9

[7] Cited in Hazell et al 2010-note % are different from those given to CASC

[8] See Hazell et al 2010 , page 119

[9] Quoted in First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) Information Rights Decision notice fs50841228 Appeal Reference: EA/2020/0240

[10] CASC (2006). Seventh Report: Freedom of Information: One Year On, 72

[11] See Birkinshaw, Patrick . (2005). Freedom of Information: the law, the practice and the ideal. Butterworths: London

[12] The Times [Editorial]. (30/9/2005). ‘Open up: Britain’s bureaucracy is still far too fond of secrecy’ and Times (30/9/2005). ‘How Requests are Stalled’.

[13] CASC 2006). Seventh Report: Freedom of Information: One Year On, 30

[14] Hazell, R., Worthy, B., & Glover, M. (2010). The Impact of the Freedom of Information Act on central government in the UK. Does FOI Work, p118-119.

[15] Peter Geoghegan, Jenna Corderoy and Lucas Amin (2020) UK government running ‘Orwellian’ unit to block release of ‘sensitive’ information https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/freedom-of-information/uk-government-running-orwellian-unit-to-block-release-of-sensitive-information/

[16] Ibid

[17] First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) Information Rights Decision notice fs50841228 Appeal Reference: EA/2020/0240 Heard on CVP platform On 29/30 April 2021 CASC 2006, 29

[18] Ben Worthy (2021) From private emails to Post-it Notes: How politicians avoid scrutiny Open Democracy https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/freedom-of-information/private-emails-post-it-notes-how-politicians-avoid-scrutiny/

[19] see Ben Worthy (2020) What the RHI Inquiry tells us about the ‘chilling effect’ of freedom of information laws The Constitution Unit https://constitution-unit.com/2020/04/23/what-the-rhi-inquiry-tells-us-about-the-chilling-effect-of-freedom-of-information-laws/

[20] See IFG (2021) Whitehall Monitor https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/whitehall-monitor-2021/transparency

[21] See Worthy, B (2017) The Politics of Freedom of Information: How and Why Governments Pass Laws That Threaten Their Power. Manchester: MUP.

Lobbying the UK: Evidence to PACAC

Evidence for Propriety of Governance in Light of Greensill

Ben Worthy, Birkbeck College, University of London and Stefani Langehenning, Birkbeck College, University of London.

Summary

• Lobbying activity is opaque and there are large gaps in the data.
• Rather than being the ‘next big scandal’, lobbying is continually monitored with regular low level stories on interests or connections, punctuated by high profile scandals.
• Lobbying stories and sanctions probably act to reinforce pre-existing public views of lobbying and what it means for democracy.

1.The Evidence

1.1 This evidence comes from a Leverhulme Trust funded study, looking at how new data and platforms are allowing groups to monitor what politicians do. As part of this, we have examined lobbying in the UK Parliament. It focuses on two of the questions:

• How should lobbying activity be regulated? How far does the Lobbying Act provide an effective statutory basis for the regulation of lobbying?
• Are sanctions for those who breach the current rules sufficient?

2. Lobbying and Missing Data

2.1 When looking into lobbying, one of the fundamental problems is that the data doesn’t exist. We simply don’t know the scale of the problem or what is happening. Repeat attempts to open up lobbying have had limited impact.  David Cameron’s Register of Lobbyists committed to make available details of who was lobbying but there are, as many noted at the time, very significant gaps. The register does not cover Parliament at all and does not cover ‘in-house’ lobbying.

2.2. What is covered by the Register is only a very small part of the overall activity. According to one study

…only about 29% of clients listed in the lobby register appear in the published record of ministerial meetings with outside groups, and less than 4% of groups disclosed in ministerial meetings records appear in the lobby register[1].

2.3. Other potential sources of data about lobbying are problematic. The Register of Members’ Financial Interests, as another example, is not searchable, despite recommendations from the CSPL that it should be[2]. Data on meetings, gifts and hospitality are incomplete or late[3]. The difficulties compare unfavourably with sites like EU Integrity Watch, a platform that allows users to easily search meetings and links.^[4]

2.4 But it’s also a problem with exactly how lobbying works. As David Cameron put it ‘we all know how it works. The lunches, the hospitality, the quiet word in your ear, the ex-ministers and ex-advisers for hire’. Many lobbying modes are tacit or informal and can be done in ways that avoid official recording.

2.5 The public are also aware of what is not known or hidden. In 2021 a survey found that ‘two-thirds (67%) of UK adults feel the public should know more about lobbyists seeking to influence MPs and Ministers new CIPR research can reveal…Only 15% believe the public currently has enough information about who is lobbying’^[5].

3.Patterns of Monitoring Lobbying

3.1. Although David Cameron said it was the ‘next big scandal’, it is better seen as a continual scandal bubbling away in various forms and with different degrees of intensity. Transparency International counted 14 lobbying and interests scandals in one year alone[6].  In-between the high-profile scandals there are a continual stream of stories based around the Register of Interests, passes or donations, which are directly or indirectly linked to lobbying.

3.2. Lobbying in Parliament is monitored by a mixed group of journalists, campaigners, and activists. The lack of data means they must rely on indirect methods. Many of the high-profile revelations come via undercover exposure by the media, but monitoring can also be done indirectly by making FOI requests for meetings or room bookings, or by carefully following the money and connections. Sophie Hill’s piecing together of links and networks on the My Little Crony site is a good example of what can be achieved[7].

3.3 The lack of data, and nature of the revelations, creates problems for both the public and politicians. For the public, the secrecy and data gaps are filled with doubt and scepticism. The public believe politicians are self-interested, corporations have too much influence and Parliament is probably corrupt. A survey by Transparency International showed that 76% of the British public strongly believe that wealthy individuals exert undue influence on governments, and the apparent secrecy and drip of revelations acts to confirm it.^[8]The continual revelations, pieced together by investigation or revelation, act to reinforce pre-existing perception and views of politicians and lobbying. This builds a particularly negative view of lobbying and what its influence on democracy is.

3.4 For politicians, the ‘revelatory’ nature of the exposes and links lead to further investigations and questions, which further damage the system and probably act to reinforce negative public perceptions.

4. Sanctions and Lobbying

4.1. Any sanctions need to be carefully balanced with the need for members to remain flexible in their work. Our ongoing research has found that sanctions relating to lobbying and interest issues are often invoked and mentioned in the media. These sanctions sit on a continuum from minor to major. Errors on declarations can lead, in some cases, to an apology[9]. Some articles mention the PCS, pointing to ongoing investigations or calls for one in the future. Many ‘interest’ stories, scandals or exposes are accompanied with general calls for change, though calls for change rarely translate into actual reforms[10].

4.2 One unknown is what impact the sanctions have on those watching. If, for example, an MP apologises, do voters see the apology or notice the wrongdoing? Do certain sanctions act to reinforce perceptions rather than show resolution?

4.3. Despite the argument that elections act as the ultimate sanction, they may not always be reliable means of removing politicians engaged in questionable behaviour. Research from the MPs’ expenses scandal points to accountability being blunted by partisan bias.[11]

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[1] See McKay, A.M., Wozniak, A. Opaque: an empirical evaluation of lobbying transparency in the UK. Int Groups Adv 9, 102–118 (2020)

[2]Though others have created platforms where they can be searched. See this platform here https://www.membersinterests.org.uk/

[3] See IFG (2020) Whitehall Monitor p 88 https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/whitehall-monitor-2020_1.pdf#page=88

[4] See the Integrity Watch site here https://www.integritywatch.eu/organizations

[5] See this CIPR poll https://www.publicaffairsnetworking.com/news/cipr-research-reveals-the-public-want-to-know-more-about-lobbying-activity

[6] Transparency International (2015) https://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/liftthelid

[7] See Sophie Hill’s visualisations here https://www.sophie-e-hill.com/post/my-little-crony/

[8] See the surveys at https://capx.co/how-powerful-is-big-business-in-britain-the-answer-may-surprise-you/    and at https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/sleaze-cronyism-lobbying-govenment-poll-b1835726.html 

[9] See this House of Commons Briefing https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn03169/

[10] See Crepaz, M. (2017). Why do we have lobbying rules? Investigating the introduction of lobbying laws in EU and OECD member states. Interest Groups & Advocacy, 6(3), 231-252.

[11] See Larcinese, V., & Sircar, I. (2017). Crime and punishment the British Way. European Journal of Political Economy, 47, 75-99. Eggers, A. C. (2014). Partisanship and electoral accountability: Evidence from the UK expenses scandal. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 9(4), 441-472.

Dancing in the Dark? The central problem with lobbying in the UK is the lack of data

There are multiple ironies around David Cameron’s involvement in the Greensill lobbying scandal. The Prime Minister who would ‘sort’ the problem of corporate lobbying and interests in 2010, instead came to personify it in 2021. The moderniser so keen on others’ openness in office, admitted to using secret channels to influence decisions once he had left. Yet beyond Cameron’s own folly, his appearance has also revealed much about why lobbying is such a persistent problem in British politics. His defences and explanations helped demonstrate why, despite the sound and fury of reform, so little has been done, and ‘lobbying’ and ‘interests’ continue to be such persistent problems.

Our project on monitory democracy has shown that lobbying is not, as David Cameron said back in 2010, the next big scandal waiting to happen. The problem of corporate influence and ‘democratic distortion’ has been ever present in British political life. Rather than a ‘big bang’, since the 1990s it has been a continual, rolling controversy, with major scandals and minor questions about interests and lobbying raised monthly, if not weekly. Underneath the big stories in 2021, we’ve seen a steady stream of revelations about ex-MPs lobbying,  lobbyists with passes in the House of Lords to big tech and APPGs.

The central problem is the data gap. Aside from the drip of revelations, we don’t know the scale of the problem or what is happening. This is partly a consequence of the unrecordable way lobbying works. Back in 2010, Cameron explained about ‘the lunches, the hospitality, the quiet word in your ear, the ex-ministers and ex-advisers for hire, helping big business find the right way to get its way’. To this we can now add, thanks to David Cameron in 2021, the barrage of texts and WhatsApp messages.

But even where there should be data, there simply isn’t. The kind of granular data required to know who is lobbying whom doesn’t exist. Cameron’s Register of Lobbyists, which he robustly defended in his appearance, committed to making available details of who was lobbying. But the Register was designed only to cover third-party activity, missing both the ‘in-house’ work that makes up around 85% of all lobbying and Parliament as an institution. Overall, the Register reveals very little. According to one study

…only about 29% of clients listed in the lobby register appear in the published record of ministerial meetings with outside groups, and less than 4% of groups disclosed in ministerial meetings records appear in the lobby register.

Another study estimated around only 1 in 20 lobbyists were covered. It could well be that the 74,714 meetings you can see here, courtesy of Transparency International, are just the tip of the iceberg.

Many other potential sources of data about lobbying or connections are equally patchy. The Register of Members’ Financial Interests, as another example, is not fully searchable (though you can search it here). Data on meetings, gifts, and hospitality, which Cameron also championed, are incomplete or late. Loopholes abound, and some ministers seem unsure if meetings are for private business or because they are minister, while lobbyists can simply switch off their cameras for a meeting not to be officially recorded.

Put together, it means that we are still roughly where we were in 2010, when a soon-to-be Prime Minister complained that we ‘don’t know who is meeting whom. We don’t know whether any favours are being exchanged. We don’t know which outside interests are wielding unhealthy influence’. Interestingly, this survey shows that people know they don’t know enough, with ‘only 15% believing the public currently has enough information about who is lobbying’.  The difficulties compare unfavourably with sites like EU Integrity Watch, a platform that allows users to easily search meetings and links. In the US, you can see State level data on lobbyists as well as Congressional level and even the interaction of gender, race, and money.

This lack of data then has consequences for the public and for politicians. Lobbying itself is a necessary and healthy part of our democratic process and helped give us seatbelts and change the conversation on climate change. Yet for the public, the secrecy and gaps are filled by doubt and scepticism. A survey by Transparency International also showed that 76% of the British public strongly believe that wealthy individuals exert undue influence on government. Politicians, they believe, are often self-interested, corporations have too much influence, and politics is probably corrupt. David Cameron’s appearance will have pretty much confirmed the ‘far-too-cosy relationship between politics, government, business and money’.

For politicians, the secrecy and opacity have a tendency to trigger more digging and more questions, so investigations rapidly gather pace, and run out of control. Greensill began with Cameron’s texts but has now been overtaken with ‘cash for curtains’ in one direction, and a quiet drink with Matthew Hancock in another. Select committees, opposition MPs, journalists and campaign groups are all pulling at different threads and following money and interests in different directions. There is then the start of another damaging cycle of investigations, revelations and (frequently broken) promises of reform.

Our research has shown how, if you want to monitor lobbying, you must get the data yourself. Most often it’s the undercover expose, making FOI requests for meetings or room bookings, or following the money on the Register of Interests, or carefully piecing together links and networks. The Greensill emerged through a mixture of patient checking, FOI requests, and leaks. The way in which data comes out often worsens the perceptions and sense there is a problem.

More data won’t end the problem of money and politics, but it may end the cycle of secrecy, exposure, and revelation. The presence of granular data may act as a deterrent and could, just like the new expenses regime, make certain actions impossible. In a final twist, could Cameron’s scandal kickstart an end to the data gap? Knowing more would be a first step toward lobbying becoming, and being seen as, less of a problem.

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Note: the project on which the above draws is funded by the Leverhulme Trust. If you have used Parliament data, please help with the project survey here.

Originally published here on LSE Policy and Politics https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/lobbying-data/

About the Authors

Ben Worthy is Senior Lecturer in Politics at Birkbeck, University of London.

Stefani Langehennig isPostdoctoral Researcher at Birkbeck, University of London.

Dr Ben Worthy: ‘Freedom of Information is a democratic right’